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ABSTRACT 
American legal realism was committed to examining legal reasoning in 
terms of the actual experiences of judges. Because the realist project 
sought to use social science tools to examine human nature, the 
contemporary rise of cognitive neuroscience provides an occasion for re-
examining legal realism’s foundational critique of the law. Realism’s 
attempt to examine “the actual facts of judicial behavior” and to pursue a 
“scientific description and prediction of judicial behavior” appears to be 
a suitable vehicle for considering the relevance of cognitive neuroscience 
for legal theory. Cognitive neuroscience has provided convincing evidence 
for rejecting the traditional bifurcation between “reason” and “emotion.” 
Moreover, cognitive neuroscience has revealed key heuristic biases in 
human reasoning. As such, the dominant form of legal reasoning might 
rely on a flawed conception of rationality. Therefore this flawed 
understanding may have implications for the legitimacy of judicial 
decisions. Rule-based reasoning has informed the image of rational 
adjudication that undergirds our conception of the rule of law, but rule-
based reasoning does not appear to be a complete description of how 
judges decide cases. Furthermore, the received view of legal rationality 
does not appear capable of accounting for alternative theories of 
adjudication.   
 
 
   B.A., Kenyon College. J.D., Emory University. Executive Director, Cause of Action 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A judicial decision is a social event. As such, rationality in law—how 
judges make decisions and how those decisions are weighed and reasoned 
about within legal discourse—is a question not of pure logic, but of social 
experience. As such, a full picture of judicial decision-making involves 
psychology, economics, and political theory, in addition to law. The social 
event of judging can be considered a rational legal process if it achieves 
logical and social legitimacy. Legal rationality, then, depends upon 
legitimate adjudication. If a theory of legal rationality is to explain how 
judges make decisions, why standards of consistency, clarity, and 
predictability are appealing, and how (or whether) precedent, rules, and 
doctrine make the law work, then a theory that relies upon the science of 
human decisions for an account of legal reasoning is essential. 
Unfortunately, this depiction of the law does not inform how American 
jurisprudence conceptualizes either legal reasoning or the rule of law. 
During the turn of the 20th century, the received view of legal theory 
was threatened by the foundational challenge posed by the American legal 
realism movement. American legal realism (hereinafter “realism”) 
critiqued the formalist view of law as a body of rule-based prescriptions. 
While realism dealt with questions of legal meaning, judicial deference, 
legal positivism, civil procedure, and much more, this article focuses only 
on realism as a critique of judicial reasoning. The formalist understanding 
of judicial decision-making, with its focus on rule-based reasoning in 
particular, involves a special theory of explanation, which I call “Legal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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Rationalism.” Thus, I understand realism as a critique of Legal 
Rationalism.  
However, the substance of realism did not travel far beyond this 
critique of Legal Rationalism.
1
 American legal realism is said to have 
failed because it could not build a constructive system for law.
2
 Realism’s 
lack of a constructive system resulted from first, the realists’ rejection of 
the theory that legal rules constrained judicial decision-making, which led 
to the impractical conclusion that legal rules lacked relevance,
3
 and 
second, the realists’ inability to propose a workable alternative to their 
criticism of judicial decision-making.
4
 
This article revives American legal realism by showing how 
contemporary findings in cognitive neuroscience give us reason to revisit 
the realists’ major premise that legal rules do not constrain judicial 
decision-making, in addition to providing a potential solution to the two 
key problems confronted by realism (i.e., (1) maintaining the relevance of 
legal rules and (2) providing a workable alternative to Legal Rationalism). 
Consistent with Felix Cohen’s description of legal realism as offering a 
“functional approach,” we may describe the examination of judicial 
reasoning in the context of neurocognitive science as functionalism.
5
  
Legal Rationalism, which is the widely accepted view of legal theory, 
must be reexamined in light of recent developments in cognitive 
neuroscience and their translatability to the work of social science. 
Because legal theory must examine cognitive neuroscience in explaining 
judicial decision-making both empirically, as a description of how judges 
actually make decisions, and normatively, as a description of how judges 
ought to evaluate disputes, legal realism’s foundational critique of the law 
 
 
 1. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 158 (1995).  
 2. David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence 
of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 437 (2010). 
 3. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986) (“Some realists . . . said there is no such thing 
as law, or that law is only a matter of what the judge had for breakfast.”).  
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 3 (2001) (“Legal realism failed to 
deliver on its promises, and by the end of World War II had petered out.”); See also Michael Heise, 
The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New 
Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 822 (2002) (“The legal realism movement provided the first 
significant and visible forum for the intersection between applied social science and legal scholarship. 
Concurrent with the development of legal realism, critical events were unfolding outside law schools 
that, in time, enormously influenced empirical legal research. Prominent among these events was the 
emergence of the social sciences as discrete fields of study and the development of related 
methodologies. As a movement, however, legal realism . . . came and went.”).  
 5. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 812 (1935) (“[T]he traditional language of argument and opinion neither explains nor justifies 
court decisions.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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must be reconsidered.
6
 To say legal theory needs to be rethought is to 
argue for a methodological shift, akin to Felix Cohen’s foretelling that 
“[c]reative legal thought will more and more look behind the pretty array 
of ‘correct’ cases to the actual facts of judicial behavior, will make 
increasing use of statistical methods in the scientific description and 
prediction of judicial behavior, will more and more seek to map the hidden 
springs of judicial decision and to weigh the social forces which are 
represented on the bench.”7 
The functionalist argument against Legal Rationalism and the argument 
proposed herein proceeds as follows: Legal Rationalism, the theory that 
rule-based reasoning
8
 can explain judicial decision-making, is 
epistemically suspect. Rule-based reasoning fails as an account of judicial 
decision-making for two reasons: First, rule-based reasoning is internally 
inconsistent because, in hard cases, judges do not decide cases based on 
proposition-like rules. Second, it misunderstands the nature of decision-
making by wrongly assuming that reasoning based on proposition-like 
rules is possible, rational, or actually occurring. The failure of Legal 
Rationalism calls for a new theory, and functionalism ultimately 
challenges the logic of the positivistic theory of the rule of law. The claim 
of functionalism, consistent with the realist critique, is that neurocognitive 
science reveals that there are tacit bases for judicial preferences that 
influence decisions, and an ideal theory of law must be able to explain 
these preferences. This Article proposes a theory of legitimacy, which 
suggests that if judges focused on the “legitimacy” of their decisions as 
opposed to the “rationality” of their conclusions, they would have a basis 
for either accounting for or constraining those non rule-like (propositional) 
elements of legal reasoning, which I suggest are heuristic biases. In the 
most casuistic of terms, legal rationalists (positivists) believe that reason is 
the core of the rule of law because rationality protects political legitimacy. 
Functionalism, on the contrary, holds that empirically legitimate judicial 
decision-making guarantees the rationality of those decisions and thus 
grounds the rule of law in legitimacy.  
 
 
 6. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully evaluate the implications of neuroscience for the 
law. Instead, this paper seeks to make the case that studying neuroscience is relevant to the study of 
law, not merely for the practical utilities of presenting new evidence in criminal cases, but from a 
foundational perspective of evaluating the judicial decision-making process in the abstract.  
 7. Cohen, supra note 5, at 833.  
 8. While rule-based reasoning appears merely to be a theory about how judges think, the theory 
also suggests a political philosophy about the rule of law—one that holds that rationality secures 
legitimacy. I call this the theory of rationalism.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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There is a high impact to the idea that judges must concern themselves 
with what is legitimate as opposed to what is rational: it proposes a better 
descriptive theory of judicial decision-making by accounting for non-
propositional influences while at the same time prescribing a more 
workable theory of law. Functionalism is something more than a mere 
academic appreciation for the natural sciences by lawyers. Ultimately, 
functionalism buttresses legal realism’s critique of Legal Rationalism by 
using the natural sciences to investigate the heuristic biases implicit within 
judicial reasoning.  
In Part I of this Article, I outline the received understanding of the rule 
of law and explain why this traditional theory supports Legal Rationalism 
as a theory about law. Part II explains how Legal Rationalism fails to be a 
workable theory of jurisprudence. In Part III, I argue that a functional 
approach to jurisprudence can explain bias in judicial decision-making and 
help build theories about judging that can help minimize judicial bias and 
resolve issues presented by Legal Rationalism. In Part IV, I apply the 
problem of jurisprudential bias to administrative law, arguing that 
functionalism motivates an approach to judging that advances a principle 
of political legitimacy.  
II. THE RULE OF LAW 
The guiding concept of the legitimacy of legal institutions is the rule of 
law. In America, the rule of law has special significance for the role of 
judges in legal interpretation. We say that our judges are guided by the 
rule of law and what we mean by that is that our judges will issue fair, 
balanced, and truth-concerned opinions when resolving disputes. The rule 
of law ensures a society ruled by law, order, and justice—not executive 
whim, not financial influence, and not partisan zealotry. The standard view 
of the rule of law is that law preserves political legitimacy.  
The rule of law is a statement on legitimate political authority. The 
“rule of law requires that the state only subject the citizenry to publicly 
promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative function be separate from the 
adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the law.”9 
The rule of law is often contrasted to the “rule of men,” which “generally 
connotes unrestrained and potentially arbitrary personal rule by an 
unconstrained and perhaps unpredictable ruler.”10 The rule of law, then, is 
 
 
 9. Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001).  
 10. Id. at 1313.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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understood as bastion against a structure of law that can be changed 
unilaterally and arbitrarily.
11
 As a principle of legitimate political 
authority, the rule of law “requires fairly generalized rule through law; a 
substantial amount of legal predictability (through generally applicable, 
published, and largely prospective laws); a significant separation between 
the legislative and the adjudicative function; and widespread adherence to 
the principle that no one is above the law.”12 Whether the rule of law is 
defined as a series of principles about the separation of the state from the 
society,
13
 the public nature of law,
14
 or the notion that the law is somehow 
immune to political or personal preferences,
15
 the rule of law aims to 
ensure legitimacy in political affairs. But does it? 
The rule of law is both a theory of institutions and a theory of 
institutional actors. The former theory demands the types of social-
scientific inquiries involved in the study of bureaucratic rule-making, 
legislative bargaining, and democratic federalism, while the latter theory 
concerns judges and how they make decisions. When legal scholars argue 
that the “rule of law was historically defined almost entirely in terms of 
the judicial enforcement of legal rights and duties[,]” they are describing 
this institutional actor theory of the rule of law.
16
 Under the institutional 
actor theory, legitimacy is concerned with how legal actors reason. The 
rule of law’s political concerns also shape certain epistemic concerns, 
which is why the rule of law entails a theory of judicial reasoning. This 
rule-based theory of judicial reasoning is Legal Rationalism. Implied 
within the rule of law, then, is a theory of rationality. 
A. Rationalism 
The backdrop behind the American brand of the rule of law is the 
Enlightenment: the intellectual period of the West where philosophers, 
scientists, and political thinkers joined together in the insight that reason 
elevated politics towards the pursuit of truth. The Enlightenment view of 
 
 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. (emphasis added). 
 13. See THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND OTTO 
KIRCHHEIMER (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996).  
 14. Cf. BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 119 (2004) 
(“The rule of law in this sense entails public, prospective laws, with the qualities of generality, equality 
of application, and certainty.”).  
 15. See Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR 
IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (Aristotle equated the rule of law 
with the rule of reason).  
 16. GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 151 (1991).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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reason understood the human mind as a filter of sorts—one that was 
capable of applying an abstract quality of “reason” to facts in order to 
filter out the pure from the contaminated and to hone in upon those clear 
and distinct ideas that could be properly called knowledge. Reason, in this 
view, was a power of the mind and one that could uniquely filter out the 
relevant from the irrelevant. It is not surprising, then, why this 
Enlightenment view has strong appeal to the judiciary. If reason was 
capable of deciphering true knowledge and relevant ideas, then reason 
could likewise be applied to legal disputes to generate the correct theory of 
a case. Judges, when exercising their reason, would be objective and just 
and their opinions would arrive at the clear and distinct truths of the law.  
The way judges would apply reason to law is through rules. Rules, like 
clear and distinct ideas, are proposition-like and can be applied to any set 
of facts in a consistent and technical manner. Rules can help filter out 
relevant evidence from the irrelevant; rules can distinguish proper 
procedure from improper procedure and so forth. Therefore, when a judge 
reasons by the rules, that judge is not only ensuring an objective, fair, and 
rational resolution of a dispute, but that judge is also upholding the rule of 
law. This moral and political logic has informed the tradition of 
jurisprudence practiced by lawyers and judges today.  
The tradition of legal philosophy ranging from Jeremy Bentham to J.L. 
Austin to H.L.A. Hart to Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Joseph 
Raz is concerned with how judges reason. A legal opinion, after all, is an 
explanation of a judge’s reasoning.17 This legal tradition is committed to 
the Enlightenment project of linking rationality with legitimacy. This 
project has become commonplace for the institutional actors of law today. 
It remains an attractive project precisely because it claims that rational law 
is necessary and sufficient for political legitimacy. The theory holds that 
good government can be guaranteed when judges make well-reasoned 
decisions. Legal rules, under this tradition, are both a check against and an 
antidote to arbitrary power.  
This conception of law and perspective on the acquisition of legal 
knowledge; however, is premised upon a picture of rationality that is 
heavily biased towards rationalism. Rationalism suggests that something is 
really only knowable or known to the extent that it can be conveyed by 
rule-like propositions. That is to say, if something cannot be translated into 
 
 
 17. Michael Heise, Symposium: Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision-Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 839 (2002) (“[T]he actual judgment process [is] reflected in judges’ explanation 
of their reasoning.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a rule-like proposition, that thing is not a proper candidate for knowledge. 
Rule-like propositions, because of their ability to convey what is rational, 
then serve also to convey what is not rational (i.e., whatever is non-
propositional). This has high stock value politically: if a leader’s 
commands cannot be translated into rule-like propositions, that leader can 
be said to have exercised arbitrary authority (e.g., murdering first-born 
male children without explanation because the leader did not want to be 
dethroned). If, on the other hand, that leader’s commands can be 
understood in terms of rule-like propositions, whether those propositions 
are accepted or rejected, the potential for the public critique of them 
credits those commands as rational and therefore legitimate (e.g., “If one 
has a child who is both first-born and a male, then that child must be killed 
because doing so protects the King.”). We obviously all think both 
justifications may be arbitrary, but there is a cognitive difference between 
decisions which can be justified propositionally and those that cannot. The 
former, as a psychological matter, more often than not become palpable 
candidates for legal authority.
18
  
B. Legal Rationalism 
The theory of knowledge that regards reason as the source of 
knowledge has been described by philosophers as Rationalism. The 
application of Rationalism to law has been described by legal thinkers as 
positivism or formalism, but, for purposes of simplicity, let us call it Legal 
Rationalism. Legal Rationalism is the philosophy subscribed to by 
American lawyers and judges. Legal Rationalism is the theory that judges 
resolve legal disputes through legal rules, applied to facts. Legal rules, 
much like rules of reason, are capable of filtering out the legally relevant 
from the legally irrelevant in order to decipher clear and distinct legal 
ideas that become articulated as objective, fair legal conclusions that 
determine the outcome of a dispute. For the legal community, Legal 
Rationalism not only appears as a sensible approach, but it is the 
guidebook for how lawyers and judges understand the rule of law to 
function.  
Independent of whether one argues that legal rules are normative or 
positive, it is clear that legal reasoning involves the use of legal rules. This 
is a matter of common sense once we consider that our jurisprudential 
 
 
 18. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, 282 (2006) (“[W]idespread views 
that existing authorities and institutions are legitimate . . . promotes acceptance of its decisions and the 
rules it promulgates.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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objections to many legal decisions often focus on a perceived 
misapplication of legal rules—or, worse, obliviousness toward them. 
Under the “Enlightenment tradition” mentioned above, legal reasoning 
must yield conclusions that are clear, predictable, and consistent, which 
are held to constitute objective legal standards. These conclusions become 
interpreted, shared, and expressed as legal rules.  
There are a number of claims that arise from this tradition’s adherence 
to rationality: (1) legal reasoning is reasoning with rules; (2) all legal 
conclusions are derived from legal rules; (3) law is rational because judges 
can articulate the law by means of general rules; and (4) the rule of law is 
the position that law is rational because judges can articulate the law with 
rules.
19
 Criteria (1), (2), (3), and (4) are the general indicators that the rule 
of law is functioning during the adjudication process. Even when legal 
actors disagree about the scope of any one of these criteria, these 
disagreements tend to be matters of degree. They are not foundational 
disagreements concerning the role rules play in legal reasoning. Thus, if 
we accept rule-based reasoning as what judges actually, or should, do, and 
this form of reasoning is central to how the rule of law is enforced, then 
the rule of law can be accurately described as a statement about rationality. 
As such, the rule of law subscribes to the position that the rationality of 
legal decision-making guarantees its legitimacy. The theory of rationality-
as-legitimacy, whether stated as positivism or formalism, is a theory of 
Legal Rationalism. The result of this rationalist theory of knowledge is a 
positivistic theory of law.  
III. THE STANDARD VIEW OF THE RULE OF LAW FAILS AS A THEORY OF 
LEGITIMACY 
Legal Rationalism was challenged by an academic movement, which 
spanned the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, called 
American Legal Realism. American Legal Realists challenged the idea 
that judges were constrained by legal rules. They did this, in large part, by 
looking at the hard cases that were politically or socially contentious. In 
the hard cases, the application of legal rules does not clearly lead to an 
objective outcome; instead, the rules appear to conflict. Take for instance, 
regulatory matters where the government and an individual or company 
may be involved in a dispute about an agency’s regulation. The judge 
might look at the relevant legal materials, which include legislation, other 
 
 
 19. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View From Century’s 
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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court precedents, and legal holdings relevant to the dispute at issue, but 
those legal materials may ultimately lead to two conflicting rules: one rule 
says that the judge should defer to the agency’s expertise if the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute was “reasonable,” while another rule states that 
the judge should overturn the agency interpretation if such an 
interpretation was “arbitrary and capricious.” 
These cases are “hard” because they cannot be resolved simply by the 
rules—they require the judges to exercise discretion and judgment that 
may involve extra-legal considerations. What is “reasonable” or 
“arbitrary” is something that does not involve clear and distinct 
propositional statements that can be logically ordered and deduced but 
instead requires judgment—the kind that an individual human judge will 
have to make. And judges are not logic-limited computers. What the 
American Legal Realists pointed out was that in these hard cases, the 
judges crafted solutions that appeared rule-like (e.g., “The agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable/arbitrary when [factors].”) when in reality 
these judgments reflect certain policy preferences or cannot be explained 
by the rules or holdings of formal legal materials (cases, statutes, 
regulations).  
No one is likely to disagree that the American Legal Realist criticism 
of Legal Rationalism has a strong point to make. But ultimately this 
criticism failed to change American legal culture because it offered little in 
the way of a workable alternative (i.e., judges don’t apply the rules all the 
time—so what? Should judges stop following the rules? Should lawyers 
stop applying legal rules in practice?). The system would appear to break 
down. But these practical objections may not be sufficient for throwing 
out the Realist project.  
Consider what I call the “functional argument”: rule-based reasoning is 
internally inconsistent because in hard cases, judges engage in gap-filling 
which cannot be explained in terms of legal rules. These non-propositional 
justifications ultimately involve the use of heuristics—tacit cognitive tools 
for decision-making. These heuristics create biases in the reasoning 
process. Legal Rationalism either cannot account for heuristic bias or is 
committed to holding that such heuristic bias, being non-propositional, 
fails on legal rationalist grounds. Moreover, because Legal Rationalism 
fails to understand the nature of legal decision-making, heuristic bias 
appears to involve the arbitrary selection of rules contrary to rule of law 
principles of non-arbitrariness. Legal Rationalism therefore breaks down 
into skepticism because it cannot provide a rational way to select values. 
This threatens the rule of law as a theory of political legitimacy. We shall 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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now proceed in unpacking the methodology behind the functional 
argument.  
According to Jeremy Waldron, “[l]aws should be clear, public, and 
prospective, they should take the form of stable and learnable rules, they 
should be administered fairly and impartially, they should operate as limits 
on state action, and they should apply equally to each and every person, no 
matter how rich and powerful they are.”20 These standards for the rule of 
law are, on their face, epistemological (in the sense that they have validity 
as criteria of knowledge, in the rule-like propositional sense described 
above) criteria for certainty in the law. And yet these standards also serve 
a normative function in the sense that they allow the public and 
institutional actors to assign praise and blame for a judge’s fidelity or 
infidelity to these standards in his or her reasoning.  
Paradoxically, these criteria, which serve to free judicial reason from 
biasing modes of experience, preference, or politics, are at the same time 
instrumental to a form of morality about the law. Implicit, therefore, 
within these rational standards for the rule of law is an inherent ascription 
to a plurality of epistemological norms such as reasonableness, neutrality, 
generality, clarity, publicity, prospectiveness, certainty, consistency, 
forward-lookingness, non-arbitrariness, fairness, finality, efficiency, 
predictability, constancy, stability, intelligibility, clear-statement rules, 
non-retroactivity, judicial deference, and, finally, judicial discretion.
21
 
Moreover, most legal actors understand principles of clarity, predictability, 
and consistency as standards for appropriate or “good” judging. But the 
fact that judges often use these standards for evaluating whether an 
opinion is valid or sound implies that these standards confirm a sense of 
rationalistic legitimacy to judges.  
The discussion of “clear-statement rules” reflects the sense that rules 
which are clear, predictable, and consistent are those that are most 
effective at ensuring the formal theory of the rule of law: ensuring 
impartiality and protecting against arbitrariness and abuse. The clearer the 
statement of law, the more effortlessly the public can comprehend the rule 
and thus modify its behavior to meet the rule’s demands. The fact that 
legal standards structure a judge’s mental process in selecting 
 
 
 20. Jeremy Waldron, The Hamlyn Lectures 2011: The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property 
27 (NYU Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-47, 
2011), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866357. 
 21. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011). See also Vallejo v. 
Wheeler (1774) 1 Cowp. 143, 153 (Eng.). 
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“appropriate” rules while also empowering third-parties to scrutinize 
whether the judge’s conclusions are valid or sound implies that legal 
reasoning depends upon a theory of what constitutes legitimate reasoning. 
In other words, legal reasoning depends upon a theory of rationality.  
The theory of legal rationality necessary for rule-based reasoning 
requires judges to reason in such a way so that their conclusions are clear, 
predictable, and consistent. This says something not merely about the 
selection and crafting of legal rules, but the way those rules are applied as 
well.  
Legal Rationalism as such is set forth as a mechanical depiction of the 
legal decision process—one that even legal formalists might not accept as 
an accurate account of jurisprudence. One might contend that Legal 
Rationalism is concerned less with the rationality of legal rules than the 
rationality of the application of rules to a given dispute. Legal rules 
originate from judges and therefore incorporate human values and 
preferences in virtue of being human expressions, but law is said to be a 
rational process because it involves a system dependent upon correct 
applications of legal rules to facts. The rationality of this system is either 
agnostic about or foundationally independent from the rationality or 
correctness of the legal rules themselves.  
To take this objection one step further, one might claim that legal rules 
have no rational value at all but that the rationality of legal rules is merely 
an after-the-fact attribute of the judicial application of those rules to facts 
in the form of a final decision. Under this view, such a final decision 
becomes authorized as correct and thus legitimizes the correctness of its 
component parts, including the legal rules and principles at issue.  
There is obvious discretion in the judicial interpretation and application 
of legal rules, but rationalism is committed to the belief that the correct 
application of legal rules involves norms of reasoning that are limited 
merely to premises and conclusions that can be reduced to rule-like 
propositions. A judicial opinion that cannot be digested into rule-like 
propositions is suddenly suspect as arbitrary, political, over-engaged, or 
activist.  
The rule of law in the United States, as a practical matter, is the 
requirement that judicial decisions result from rule-based reasoning. Legal 
knowledge is characterized by the rule-based reasoning that creates it. 
Rule-based reasoning is a rational theory of jurisprudence because legal 
rules both exhaust and explain the legal decision-making process. As 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
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Judge Posner has stated, “judges discipline themselves to respond to the 
problems before them with careful, linear rationality.”22  
Rationality concerns how human beings make decisions.
23
 Legal actors 
tend to label as “rational” those decisions or actions by judges that appear 
intuitively legitimate. The judge’s opinion, his or her use of precedent, the 
clear articulation of the rules of law, a reasoning process employed in 
analyzing those rules, and an argument-based form are all lodestars of 
rationality that are deemed necessary for a legitimate legal outcome.  
Surely rationality, for lawyers, is not simply a question of what sounds 
good; yet, legal decision making is deeply dependent upon emotion and, 
therefore, not the sort of epistemological concept that a pure rationalist 
would deem a relevant candidate for knowledge. The judicial method of 
selecting, applying, and delineating legal rules based upon standards such 
as clarity, consistency, and predictability is not clearly rational under the 
rule-based reasoning model. For one, according to Dworkin, these 
standards are informed by policy values that are not themselves sufficient 
grounds for rational justification under (strict, rule-based reasoning-based) 
Legal Rationalism, which seeks to filter out non-propositional 
justifications as irrational.  
Rule-based reasoning thus lacks a rational means of certifying the 
rationality of its stated legal standards. If the selection of a standard cannot 
be certified in a clear statement, then it fails rationalism’s stated mode of 
justification. In other words, while judges might incorporate policy into 
decisions in a manner that appears propositional-like, nothing intrinsic to 
this reasoning process ensures that these incorporations or uses of political 
or moral values is a rational form of jurisprudence.
24
 Because, as a 
technical matter, the rule of law fails to be “rational” on its own account, 
judges must do something to legitimate their decision-making. Judges 
therefore fill logical gaps in the evaluation of a dispute with tools that do 
not originate from legal rules.  
The result is that legal inquiry is a question of how to heuristically 
weigh values, without concern for the rational validity of those values.
25
 
This failure of rules to confirm their own validity means legal rules are 
 
 
 22. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1997, 2005 (2010).  
 23. 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 291 (1997). See also Heller v. 
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (describing rationality as speculative and not based on empirical 
evidence).  
 24. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 17 (1966). 
 25. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 7 (1977) (“[J]urisprudential issues are at 
their core issues of moral principle, not legal fact or strategy.”). 
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“nonepistemic.”26 In other words, legal rules are not complete accounts of 
knowledge. If something beyond the rules and the judges’ strict, non-
discretionary reasoning based on these rules is required to certify the 
rationality of jurisprudence, then either Legal Rationalism is an 
incomplete theory of jurisprudence, or, conceding the rationalist 
conception of rationality, judicial decision-making is not merely a rational 
process. In these cases, the rule of law fails to meet its own “rational” 
standards of clarity, consistency, and predictability.  
Whether reasoning through values or employing rule-like heuristics in 
these cases, judges are not merely reasoning through rules. Judges often 
exercise “discretion,” which is a euphemism for judicial prerogative. 
Moreover, the fact that hard cases cannot be strictly resolved by rules 
reflects the indeterminacy or incompleteness of a theory of legal 
rationality bound by rules. It would be naïve to suggest that an individual 
judge is rationally capable of articulating all legally relevant facts in 
propositional terms. That is to say, not only is rule-based reasoning 
rationally insufficient, it is practically impossible. 
From these observations a number of conclusions follow, namely, 
(1) legal rules are not sufficient for legal conclusions; (2) gap-filling by 
judges cannot be explained by rules; and (3) processes of legal reasoning 
are not clear, consistent, or predictable. Based on these conclusions, it 
appears that rule-based reasoning (the rule of law) provides an inadequate, 
and indeed incomplete, account of legal reasoning. Therefore, if we wish 
to avoid errors in developing a more comprehensive and practical 
understanding of legal rationality, we need to look elsewhere. 
But these justifications lose their legitimacy on the grounds that, first, 
as a descriptive matter, emotions are impossible to filter out because 
reasoning is not rational without emotion and second, as is visible in hard 
cases, “emotions already infuse decisionmaking whether or not they are 
recognized by legal actors.”27 Emotions “have a vital role to play in legal 
thought and decisionmaking.”28 The rationalism of rule-based reasoning 
represented “a long intellectual tradition that dichotomized reason and 
emotion and construed legal thought as a professionally instilled cognitive 
process, which could be powerfully unsettled by affective response.”29 
Neuroscientists recognize emotion as a part of intelligence “just as 
 
 
 26. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 3 
(2006). 
 27. Abrams & Keren, supra note 22, at 2004.  
 28. Id. at 2003. 
 29. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RATIONALITY, LEGITIMACY, & THE LAW 15 
 
 
 
 
cognitive as other precepts.”30 “[T]he process of cognitive decisionmaking 
embodies vital affective components.”31 
Ironically, “[t]he detachment of legal rationality reflected the historic 
view of law as a quasi-science: a process of deducing, from a framework 
of legal principles, the rule to be applied to a particular case.”32 Ironic, of 
course, because legal formalism today rejects functionalism, which is 
informed by recent developments in neuroscience that dispute the anti-
scientific bifurcation of reason and emotion in the cognitive decision-
making process.
33
 There were ostensibly practical reasons for being fearful 
of the role of emotions in a presumably objective system of law. The 
relationship between emotions and political life was captured by the 
ancient Greek concept of thumos, spiritedness, which, in an ideal form, 
explains the power of democratic sentiment but can also serve as the seat 
of mob rule.
34
 In addition to concerns about politicization, emotions led to 
unpredictable discretion, fickle reasoning, and arbitrary decision-making.  
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE TO LEGAL RATIONALISM 
American Legal Realism may arguably be salvaged by recent findings 
in cognitive neuroscience, which provide an alternative to the critique of 
Legal Rationalism. In short, cognitive neuroscience tells us some new 
things that challenge the picture of the mind presented to us by 
Enlightenment-era Rationalist philosophy.
35
 The mind is not capable of 
separating reason from emotion to derive clear and distinct truths; instead, 
emotion is not only relevant to rational functioning—it is necessary to it.36 
This is why someone whose amygdala is damaged will fail to act 
rationally even if his logic center—the prefrontal lobe—is intact. 
Moreover, cognitive neuroscience reveals that human beings have 
bounded rationality—that is to say, we are prone to make errors when 
 
 
 30. Id. at 2044 (quoting ANTONIO D’AMASSIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR at xv (1994)).  
 31. Id. (citing Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV., no. 4, 2001, at 815).  
 32. Id. at 2003. 
 33. Id.  
 34. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 204–06 (1992).  
 35. See, e.g., PATRICA CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE 
MIND-BRAIN 273 (1986) (responding to the tradition of distinguishing between mental processes and 
brain processes).  
 36. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
200 (Quill 2000) (1994) (“[T]he action of biological drives, body states, and emotions may be an 
indispensable foundation for rationality.”).  
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forced to make judgments given limited information.
37
 As we are given 
more information, our judgments become improved. Take, for instance, 
Daniel Kahneman’s psychological experiment where he presents the 
challenge: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than 
the ball. How much does the ball cost?”38 Almost everyone studied by 
Kahneman and his colleagues reported an initial tendency to answer “10 
cents” because the sum $1.10 intuitively separates into $1 and 10 cents. 
Kahneman uses this example to show that human beings are biased in their 
reasoning, “often content to trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes 
to mind[,]” thus reflecting a heuristic bias in the way we conceptualize and 
reason through problems.
39
  
In the same sense, judges, when resolving a dispute, say, between 
agency reasonableness and agency arbitrariness, may be biased by certain 
heuristics they are accustomed to applying to a case—whether from their 
experience as lawyers or judges or whether from their own ideological 
preferences. There are ways to frame issues or questions to avoid bias. 
Consider: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than 
the ball. The ball is not 10 cents. How much does the ball cost?” By 
framing the issue with information provided to avoid error, the problem 
solver’s biases can be reduced. By providing more information, one can 
challenge the heuristic bias of the problem solver to think the ball costs 10 
cents. The probem solver’s rush to judgment or arithmetic bias is 
essentially slowed in its tracks by new information that informs him that 
his preconceived solution to the problem is wrong.  
If we know that judges are likewise prone to error—whether via 
heuristic biases, limited knowledge, or their bounded rationality—why, 
then, do we limit their judgment to legal rules? Would a rational judge not 
seek to minimize his risk of error or reliance on bias by consulting 
materials that may challenge his preferences or views and effectively 
debias him or present him with additional knowledge to make a more 
informed decision? This was what American Legal Realism sought to do 
but did not accomplish because its theories lacked an empirical 
foundation. We now get that foundation through cognitive neuroscience, 
and this neuroscientific foundation is not one that transforms the task of 
 
 
 37. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 323 (4th ed. 1997) (An individual’s 
rationality is “limited by the extent of his knowledge and information.”).  
 38. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in 
Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 58 
(Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
 39. Id.  
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judging into one that is reducible to cognitive neuroscience. Instead, it 
allows us to reexamine Legal Rationalism as having a rationalistic bias in 
its understanding of the rule of law. Most simply, Legal Rationalism 
endorses positivism: the theory claims that rationality (rule-based 
reasoning) guarantees legitimacy (the rule of law). If the rule of law 
represents the fairness and objectivity that defines political legitimacy and 
if the Rationalist approach of getting to legitimacy through reason is one 
that is flawed, why not consider reversing the logic of the rule of law? The 
Legal Rationalist theory of the rule of law is biased. What if legitimacy 
(reducing errors in judgment, minimizing bias) guarantees rationality 
(informed decision making)? This approach appears a more rational and 
legitimate defense of the rule of law given a foundation of cognitive 
neuroscience. Is legitimacy-as-rationality a better judicial philosophy?  
In the hard case of reasonableness poised against arbitrariness, instead 
of crafting a dubious rule, why not consider which interpretation is 
legitimate—a consideration that requires consulting empirical and legal 
materials? Legal Rationalism misunderstands human nature and is 
internally inconsistent. The rationality of heuristics which bias judicial 
decision-making (clear statement rules) must be understood in the context 
of cognitive neuroscience. Legal Rationalism encodes a series of heuristics 
upon legal actors in its bias towards rule-based reasoning. Functionalism 
thus entails a methodological shift in jurisprudence that redefines legal 
rationality. Functionalism means that judges must focus on the empirical 
validity of the decision-making process. Cognitive neuroscience can help 
legal actors determine if heuristics, which are non-propositional, are part 
of a rational jurisprudence or not. Legal theory and cognitive neuroscience 
can reach consilience in proposing research questions: whether the rule of 
law requires (1) accounting for or constraining heuristic biases or 
(2) either (a) eliminating heuristic biases, (b) determining which heuristic 
biases are valid, or (c) delimiting decision-making from any heuristic or 
doctrinal factors. These are the sorts of jurisprudential questions cognitive 
neuroscience can help answer. 
Legal Rationalism is an epistemological theory. As such, rationalism 
makes prescriptive claims on how judges ought to reason. And, as 
suggested in Part II, these prescriptive claims form biases in the ways 
judges actually reason. As Gary Peller observes, legal concepts “are 
supernatural entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the 
eyes of faith.”40 Legal rules “which refer to these legal concepts, are not 
 
 
 40. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1226 (1985).  
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descriptions of empirical social facts . . . nor yet statements of moral 
ideals, but are rather theorems in an independent system.”41 We will 
examine the biasing effect of Legal Rationalism in more detail.  
A. Legal Rationalism Biases Judgment 
The received theory of the rule of law, committed to rational standards 
of clarity, predictability, and consistency, is bound up by a folk 
psychological conception of rationality.
42
 Under this theory, reason is 
understood as a force capable of subsuming the complexities of law into 
cogent, enunciable legal propositions. Rule-based reasoning requires that 
choices “be adequately represented, conceptualized, and considered[]” 
within the confines of legal rules.
43
 Legal rules are certain, 
commensurable, and universal by being articulated as clear statements 
(propositions) of law. Rationality is thought to be expressible and 
accessible through propositions.
44
 Rational judging is reasoning through 
rules. These maxims are central to Legal Rationalism.  
The rule-based reasoning view of legal rationality cannot be defended 
as a complete rendering of legal decision-making. The fact that we know 
more than we can say presents problems for the notion that all knowledge 
is propositional or rule-like.
45
 Knowledge that is tacit (e.g., experiential 
judgment, habit, or skill) is a legitimate candidate for rationality and yet is 
excluded from the rule-based model of legal rationality.
46
 Moreover, the 
rule of law should be able to more fully account for gap-filling behavior 
by judges.  
If rule-based reasoning is a weak characterization of legal decision-
making, then the rule of law may be an incomplete theory of rationality. 
Judges, who use heuristics in legal reasoning, are seeking to make rational 
decisions. But this decision-making process is often neither legitimate nor 
rational under the strict Legal Rationalism definition of rationality 
 
 
 41. Id. at 1226–27. 
 42. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 821 (“How are we going to substitute a realistic, rational, 
scientific account of legal happenings for the classical theological jurisprudence of concepts?”).  
 43. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 45 (1998).  
 44. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 5, 16, 22 (Timothy Fuller ed., Liberty Press new and expanded ed. 1991) (1962); see also 
POLANYI, supra note 24, at 17. 
 45. See POLANYI, supra note 24, at 17.  
 46. Consider, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 822 (“[T]he term ‘functional approach’ is sometimes 
used to designate a modern form of animism, according to which every social institution or biological 
organ has a ‘purpose’ in life, and is to be judged good or bad as it achieves or fails to achieve this 
‘purpose.’”). 
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described above. Judges use standards (consistency, clarity, predictability) 
as heuristics to legitimize their opinions; but if the function of heuristics is 
to fill gaps (“gap-filling”) in the legal reasoning process, can these 
justifications be considered rationally legitimate?  
The phenomenon of “gap-filling” in legal reasoning reflects the limits 
of the Rationalist theory of law. Gap-filling occurs when a judge is 
presented with a series of facts that support two mutually exclusive rules. 
Judges often cannot resolve these “hard cases” by appealing to principles 
of clarity, predictability, and consistency. In novel situations, the 
appropriate legal rules are not clear, and the lack of precedent makes any 
legal conclusion in the case difficult to predict and apply. Judges therefore 
use heuristics to fill the gap between the rules.
47
 What is clear is that the 
rules alone cannot resolve the dispute in these hard cases. So in practice, 
the judge is using legal tools to make his or her conclusion appear legally 
valid.
48
 The result is that a rule or a rule-like principle appears to be 
invented.  
For Ronald Dworkin, the legal rules themselves necessitate certain 
underlying principles and policies that ultimately direct the judge’s 
decision in the case. Under Dworkin’s “best constructive interpretation” 
theory, judges first decide cases by determining which principles best fit, 
or make sense of, the institutional history of the legal system and then, 
second, decide the case by selecting the principles that best reflect that 
institutional history “from the standpoint of political morality.”49 In other 
words, legal rules only become meaningful after a judge has made a 
decision that comports with good policy. Those rules then become defined 
in the form of an opinion that justifies these rules as serving an 
instrumental role in arriving at a particular legal conclusion.  
What is necessary is an approach that allows for the “redefining [of] 
concepts and problems in terms of verifiable realities. . . .”50 Indeed, “[o]ur 
 
 
 47. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). 
 48. SCHLAG, supra note 43, at 31–35. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
INTERPRETATION 43 (2013) (“‘The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no 
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation,’ remains 
true for our federal courts.”) (quoting ALBERT M. SACKS & HENRY M. HART, JR., THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994); Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950) (Judges create the illusion of rational decision making when choosing 
among conflicting interpretations). 
 49. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 256. 
 50. Cohen, supra note 5, at 822.  
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legal system is filled with supernatural concepts, that is to say, concepts 
which cannot be defined in terms of experience, and from which all sorts 
of empirical decisions are supposed to flow.”51  
The confusion about rationality in the law is responsible for the 
confusions in the rule of law as a theory. If we are to look at the best 
candidate for understanding the rationality of individuals making 
decisions, that locus is not legal theory but social science, particularly the 
science of the brain.
52
 While legal theory gives rationality an emotive 
function (whether explicitly or implicitly), neuroscience views rationality 
as a mere description of how the brain works. If it turns out that human 
reasoning involves logical, emotional, analytic, and sensory processes, 
inclusive, then a complete account of the rationality of legal reasoning 
yields a definition of rationality in stark distinction from the traditional 
conception of rationality that our legal tradition has inherited from the 
Enlightenment.  
B. Functionalism  
Functionalism’s commitment to a theory of legitimacy is informed by 
the key neuroscientific finding that the rationalist bifurcation of “reason” 
and “emotion” is untenable.53 By recognizing that actual decision-making 
involves processes categorically deemed to originate in both “reason” and 
“emotion,” functionalism suggests that rationality in legal decisions is the 
product of legitimate judicial decisions—ones that recognize the role 
underlying emotional considerations play in human reasoning. On a more 
formal level, the approach to legitimacy rationalizes the legal process by 
recognizing (and avoiding) bias, particularly those biases informed by the 
reasoning model that bifurcated reason and emotion.  
In the history of political thought, the focus on legitimacy was an 
artifact of Enlightenment thinking concerned with the non-arbitrariness of 
legal authority. Positivism represents Enlightenment rationalism for law: 
what is rational or reason-based guarantees against non-arbitrariness and 
therefore suffices for political legitimacy. While legal positivists tended to 
focus on the “rationality” or reasoning of judicial decisions, they aimed to 
produce a scientific account of law—the results of which were both non-
 
 
 51. Id. at 823.  
 52. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
34–37, 41–45 (Quill 2000) (1994). 
 53. Contemporary legal theorists distinguish between social and moral facts. See, e.g., SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 275 (2011). The neurosciences suggest that these sorts of bifurcations are not 
only meaningless but lead to potentially erroneous decisions.  
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scientific and irrational. The cognitive and neurological sciences, as a 
principle of decision-making, suggest that good decisions are the result of 
both “reason” and “emotion,” which involves minimizing bias, 
supplanting information, and recognizing error. Functionalism is thus a 
marked improvement from current theories of legal decision-making. 
The judiciary is biased by rule-based reasoning and the foundations of 
rationalism. If the rule of law is aimed at ensuring fair play and substantial 
justice and if rule-based reasoning cannot fully ensure this goal nor 
account for bias, then a more muscular theory of law would be one that 
can account for those heuristic biases. Contemporary legal scholars have 
recognized the “large and growing body of scholarship [which] exhibits a 
willingness to modify the rationality assumption by using cognitive 
science, behavioral psychology, and experimental economics.”54 That is 
perhaps what neuroscience offers to the law as a foundational matter—it 
can provide evidence of preferences or biases that affect judicial 
reasoning, but it is up to the jurists to announce whether those biases 
should be eschewed from judicial calculation or somehow accounted for. 
Yet, as scholars working at the juncture of law, neuroscience, and 
economics have observed, the model of rationality inherited from the 
rationalist conception of the rule of law is flawed. “[T]he assumptions that 
humans always follow their rational self-interest or that preferences can 
necessarily be stated in a coherent way are incorrect, and therefore the 
conclusions that follow from them are questionable.”55 Indeed, the rule of 
law virtues—neutrality; generality; clarity; publicity; prospectiveness; 
certainty; consistency; forward-lookingness; non-arbitrariness; fairness; 
finality; efficiency; predictability; constancy; stability; intelligibility; 
clear-statement rules; non-retroactivity; judicial deference; and judicial 
discretion—which judges depend upon for the legitimacy of their 
reasoning—are precisely those assumed premises that have yielded 
questionable conclusions.  
 
 
 54. John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The 
Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131 (2008). See 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2008) 
(“We believe that much of the emerging empirical work on judicial behavior is best understood as a 
new generation of legal realism.”). 
 55. Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith & Terrence Chorvat, Lessons from Neuroeconomics for the 
Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 68 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. 
Smith eds., 2005). 
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The fact that the rule-based reasoning aspect of the Rationalist theory 
breaks down in hard cases proves important to legal theory.
56
 For legal 
theorists, “[t]he law functions not only to resolve typical cases but also to 
extend existing concepts and categories to new facts.”57 Moreover, it is 
these hard cases which best exemplify the inutility of these rule-of-law 
virtues, that is, the “metaphysics” or “transcendental nonsense” of 
jurisprudence itself. Or, as Felix Cohen has argued: 
Valuable as is the language of transcendental nonsense for many 
practical legal purposes, it is entirely useless when we come to 
study, describe, predict, and criticize legal phenomena. And 
although judges and lawyers need not be legal scientists, it is of 
some practical importance that they should recognize that the 
traditional language of argument and opinion neither explains nor 
justifies court decisions.
58
  
Cohen critiqued those legal concepts which informed legal theory yet 
which could not be defined through experience.
59
 For Cohen, 
jurisprudence’s tendency to rely on theoretical, non-empirical concepts 
distracts judges from being realists about legal decision-making (i.e., 
viewing their decisions as based on social policy, economics, and other 
extralegal considerations).
60
 The “mechanical jurisprudence” Cohen 
attacked represents the system of rule-based legal reasoning upheld by 
legal rationalists.  
Critics of legal formalism believe that the rationalist position relies 
upon a certain metaphysical picture that presents law as rationalistic when, 
in reality, jurisprudence is really an exercise in social policy.
61
 The 
challenge is whether the claim that “law is about social policy” is 
necessarily inconsistent with the proposition that “the rule of law depends 
upon a rational theory of law.” It may be the case that judges making 
decisions on the basis of social policy is a rational approach to law once 
the judiciary accepts the functional argument as a theory of rationality and 
debiases itself from Legal Rationalism.  
Functionalism redefines the limits of rationality. It does not merely 
substitute the empirical for the rational. Recent work in neuroscience 
 
 
 56. Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 209, 230 (2005). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Cohen, supra note 5, at 812. 
 59. Id. at 823.  
 60. Id. at 842.  
 61. Id. at 812.  
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reveals that emotions are central to human rationality.
62
 This research 
suggests that rationality in decision-making and emotion are 
complementary.
63
 In fact, emotions have been shown to be crucial for the 
facilitation of cost-benefit analysis reasoning in decision-making.
64
 At the 
same time, understanding the neuroscience behind decision-making helps 
point to biases, both heuristic and physiological, that influence (or impair) 
decision-making. Neuroscience reveals that emotion is the “first response” 
in that we exhibit emotional reactions to objects and events far more 
readily than we can articulate what those objects and events are or mean.
65
 
Strong stimuli to the amygdala inhibit activity in the prefrontal cortex, the 
region of the brain associated with logical deliberations and reasoning 
ability, which suggests that extreme emotional reactions can “short-
circuit” rational deliberation.66 Andrew Lo argues that the sorts of 
“threats” identified by the amygdala are not actually life-threatening: even 
if “our physiological reactions may still be the same[,] . . . the suppression 
of our prefrontal cortex may be unnecessary and possibly 
counterproductive . . . .”67 
Once we disabuse ourselves of the commitment to a normative theory 
of rationality and instead realize that rationality is merely a description of 
how the brain, or the human organism, or the body politic, works, then we 
can stop trying to determine what makes law rational.  
If rationality is a question of “working well,” then law is rational if it is 
able to account for the empirical data at issue in a dispute or for any other 
material facts relevant to the judge’s ability to make a legitimate decision. 
If legal disputes could be reduced to the black letter law, all disputes 
would end at the summary judgment stage: the judge would be entitled 
 
 
 62. See, e.g., DAMASIO, supra note 52. See also Edmund T. Rolls, A Theory of Emotion, and Its 
Application to Understanding the Neural Basis of Emotion, 4 COGNITION & EMOTION, no. 3, 1990, at 
161; Edmund T. Rolls, Neurophysiology and Functions of the Primate Amygdala, in THE AMYGDALA: 
NEUROBIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EMOTION, MEMORY, AND MENTAL DYSFUNCTION 143 (John P. 
Aggleton ed., 1992); Edmund T. Rolls, A Theory of Emotion and Consciousness, and Its Application 
to Understanding the Neural Basis of Emotion, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1091 (M. 
Gazzaniga ed., 1995). 
 63. Stephen Grossberg & William E. Gutowski, Neural Dynamics of Decision Making Under 
Risk: Affective Balance and Cognitive-Emotional Interactions, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. no. 3, 1987, at 300. 
 64. EDMUND T. ROLLS, THE BRAIN AND EMOTION ch. 10.3 (1999). 
 65. See GAVIN DE BECKER, THE GIFT OF FEAR: SURVIVAL SIGNALS THAT PROTECT US FROM 
VIOLENCE (1997); R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. 
PSYCHOL., no. 2, 1980, at 151; R. B. Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39 AM. PSYCHOL., no. 2, 1984, 
at 117. 
 66. ROY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-
REGULATION (1994).  
 67. Andrew W. Lo, Fear, Greed, and Financial Crises: A Cognitive Neurosciences Perspective, 
in HANDBOOK ON SYSTEMIC RISK 622, 642 (Jean-Pierre Foque & Joseph A. Langsam eds., 2013).  
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only to evaluate material issues of fact and render judgments based on 
those facts, as a matter of law. Appeals would not be necessary because 
they would suggest that the law is unclear or that a trial judge misapplied 
the law, which would be impossible if the law was clear and proposition-
like. And yet judges are engaged in deciding what the law is, which entails 
that the question, “What is the law?” is not clear, a priori. The rationality 
of law, then, derives from the legitimacy of the reasoning and analysis, not 
some formulaic ordering of black-letter rules.  
Findings in cognitive neuroscience can help judges recognize bias 
within their decision-making process. Some might interpret the results of 
functionalism as implying judicial conservatism by recognizing that 
certain external preferences might bias decision-making, and, therefore, 
that recognition of bias encourages judicial deference to strict proposition-
based reasoning; however, on the contrary, some might interpret 
functionalism as suggesting an engaged decision-making process which 
looks at propositional thinking as overly biased in ways that ignore 
relevant experiential factors that may increase precision and accuracy in 
the decision-making process. Whether the option is to overcome bias or 
merely determine which biases are relevant or useful, functionalism 
provides unique conceptual tools for judicial decision-making and sets the 
foundation for theorizing about jurisprudence.  
This is not to say that jurisprudence becomes merely one branch of 
neuroscience or that law is reducible to cognitive neuroscience. 
Functionalism merely probes the relationship between the nature of human 
reasoning and the structure of law—the goal of jurisprudence and legal 
philosophy. No one is likely to disagree that cognitive neuroscience 
reveals deep insights about the nature of reasoning. And this has 
implications for the nature of legal reasoning. Legal Rationalism, inclusive 
of positivism and formalism, purportedly focuses on the rationality of 
legal decision-making with the end-goal of ensuring a legitimate, non-
arbitrary, and deferential system of jurisprudence. But, as has been shown 
above, the backdrop of rationality and the system of rule-based reasoning 
are deeply confused. Functionalism, if anything, seeks to minimize the 
obvious errors involved in rationalistic legal reasoning. As a practical 
matter, because functionalism is concerned with the validity of the 
reasoning process, it promotes a jurisprudence focused on legitimacy, with 
the end goal of ensuring the rationality of the decision-making process.  
Neurocognitive insights into decision-making are of practical help to 
judges. By approaching legal questions from the background of 
neuroscientific insight into the tacit bases for judicial preferences that 
influence decisions, judges can be more attuned to their own reasoning 
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process. Functionalism means that an ideal theory of law must be able to 
either account for or constrain these preferences. Formalists might find the 
idea of constraining tacit judicial preferences appealing as a form of 
judicial restraint; critical theorists might find the idea of jurisprudence 
accounting for the universe of preferences attractive as a form of judicial 
openness or integrity; yet, whichever judicial ideology one finds attractive, 
both views would be uninformed without recognizing the relevance of 
cognitive neuroscience. A judge who focuses on legitimacy would ask him 
or herself whether there are background influences involved in his or her 
decision-making process and would seek to articulate why—or why not—
those influences are important for a valid decision. This kind of self-
reflectiveness, I would argue, rather than a strict concern for formulaic or 
canonized jurisprudential structure, is actually necessary for rational legal 
thought. The heuristic bias towards rationalism is itself non-rational. 
Functionalism provides a more workable theory of law and provides a 
stronger foundation for debates about judicial discretion.  
Evaluating how judges decide cases is not a question of formal rules, 
but of cognitive legitimacy. The social-political event of judging, when 
legitimate, effectively rationalizes the legal process itself. Instead of 
conceiving of the rule of law in terms of an antediluvian notion of 
rationality, one that makes judges susceptible to the heuristic bias that 
rule-based reasoning is accurate, complete, or, most importantly, non-
arbitrary, a better jurisprudential bias is one where judges concern 
themselves with the apparent legitimacy of their reasoning and decision-
making. If judges were to concern themselves with empirical validity, 
judicial determinations would be better, more accurate, and less arbitrary. 
In other words, they would be more legitimate and rational.  
Functionalism does not need to make the realist move (i.e., to use fMRI 
studies to determine how judicial brains work). Neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology best contribute to jurisprudence in revealing facts 
about human behavior and human decision-making that help judges 
minimize bias in their reasoning. While the concern of Enlightenment 
liberalism was fighting political arbitrariness and elevating reason in 
society, the concern of functionalism is fighting heuristic bias in the law. 
The end of functionalism is ultimately one shared by liberalism: political 
legitimacy and the promotion of rationality in law.  
Functionalism theorizes about neuroscience in terms of social events, 
and judicial events in particular. Functionalism advocates a judicial 
approach that recognizes the potential for error in legal reasoning and 
humbly seeks to reduce error by recognizing the value of empirical 
research. So long as there are reasons to accept that judge-made law ought 
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be a rational, as opposed to arbitrary, process, and so long as there are 
legitimate reasons to believe that legal formalism may subject judges to err 
in their decisionmaking, then a jurisprudence of functionalism should help 
to redefine how we understand the law as a rational process.
68
  
Functionalism is a special theory of judicial outcomes, as opposed to 
legislative determinations. The legislative process, while incorporating 
legal analysis, is chiefly not concerned with the reasoning process of 
legislators as much as the bargaining process amongst interested parties. 
Legislative error is corrected by the people who elect legislators. Judicial 
error must be corrected by judges; as a practical matter, when legislative 
bodies overturn judicial decisions, it is less because of the errors in 
reasoning or judgment about what the law is so much as the perceived 
error in judgment of what the law should be given a certain political 
preference or context.  
Just as Plato sought to define “justice” by assessing the activities of a 
just state,
69
 and Aristotle conceived of the soul as the way a living body 
behaves,
70
 functionalism’s skepticism towards rule-based reasoning helps 
to redefine legal rationality as the phenomenon of legitimate judicial 
decision-making. Felix Cohen recognized that creative legal thought looks 
“behind the pretty array of ‘correct’ cases to the actual facts of judicial 
behavior” and makes “increasing use of statistical methods in the scientific 
description and prediction of judicial behavior.”71  
The received theory of the rule of law suggests that the rational judge 
obfuscates social policy via technical rules. While realism sought to place 
social policy as the foundation “that gives weight to any rule or 
precedent,”72 functionalism suggests that it would be an error for judges to 
a priori reject social policy foundations to legal outcomes as irrational, 
“activist,” or an abuse of discretion.  
Evaluating how judges decide cases is not a question of formal rules, 
but of social science. The social act of resolving a dispute, if a normatively 
and empirically legitimate assessment of the relevant information before 
 
 
 68. 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 1, 6 
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934) (“In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual 
conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity 
from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning 
of the conception.”). 
 69. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1968). 
 70. 3 ARISTOTLE, De Anima, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 402 (W.D. Ross & J.A. Smith eds., 
1931). 
 71. Cohen, supra note 5, at 833.  
 72. Id. at 834.  
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the court, guarantees the rationality of the legal process. Instead of 
conceiving of the rule of law in terms of Rationality (rule-based reasoning) 
guaranteeing Legitimacy (non-arbitrariness), it appears that a better theory 
of law is one of functionalism—that is, where Legitimacy (examining all 
relevant information) guarantees Rationality (optimal decisions). 
Functionalism theorizes about neuroscience in terms of social events, and 
judicial events in particular. The study of neuroscience as a social science 
leads to better predictability for assessing adjudication than does the 
rationalistic approach of rule-based reasoning. 
John Drobak and Douglass North acknowledge the rationalism of 
contemporary legal reasoning, claiming, “[t]he dominant model of judicial 
decision-making is an outgrowth of rational choice theory: the judge is a 
rational actor who reasons logically from facts, previous decisions, 
statutes, and constitutions to reach a decision.”73 And yet Drobak and 
North explain that “[e]veryone knows, however, that this model explains 
only part of the process.”74  
While legal realism and its progeny critiqued rule-based reasoning for 
“failing to include non-doctrinal factors that affect the outcome of 
cases[,]”75 this response well recognizes the symptoms of rule-based 
reasoning without diagnosing the pathology. Drobak and North recognize 
the underlying heuristic biases involved in judicial decision-making, 
ultimately supporting a functional approach: “[i]n order to understand 
fully how judges decide cases, we need to understand how the mind 
works.”76 
Ultimately, debiasing legal reasoning and broadening legal reasoning 
to account for a fuller picture of experience suggests that “[w]e need to 
know how judges perceive the issues involved in lawsuits, how they see 
competing priorities and available choices, and how they make their 
decisions.”77  
One of the key problems with propositional accounts of legal decision-
making is the question of discretion. While judicial discretion is often 
justified on the basis of definitive rules and principles, “the non-doctrinal 
factors that make up discretion are an invisible part of judicial decision-
making that cannot be explained with any precision . . . .”78 Ultimately 
 
 
 73. Drobak & North, supra note 54, at 131. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 132. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 134.  
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Drobak and North argue that “we cannot understand all the hidden factors 
that influence judicial outcomes.”79 
A contemporary legal realist cannot ignore the science of the brain. 
This realist turn in legal theory, that is to say, the attempt to justify 
jurisprudence empirically, is deeply pragmatic, for the meaning of law 
becomes derived from the description of its processes: “[i]n order to 
ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider 
what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from 
the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will 
constitute the entire meaning of the conception.”80 Functionalism, as a 
jurisprudential method, demands the debiasing of the judiciary from rules 
and principles that eschew empirical research from meaningful 
incorporation into the legal reasoning process.  
One might wonder why functionalism is a distinctly jurisprudential, 
versus, say, legislative approach to decisionmaking. Or, one might suggest 
that the formalism of jurisprudence works to preserve the coordination 
between the different branches and that empirical evaluation and 
pragmatic considerations are better suited for the legislative branch or 
administrative agencies, but only the judiciary is intrinsically concerned 
with legal reasoning. Legislation is the result of accumulated political 
interests, and administrative rules serve a regulatory purpose within a 
field—these laws are not governed by any particular type of legal 
reasoning and are designed to serve either niche public policy concerns or 
constitutional interests under the spending, commerce, and general welfare 
clauses. The Constitution specifies that Article III lawmakers are resolving 
disputes between parties, in the form of an actual case or controversy. 
How these disputes are resolved have public policy consequences and 
rational, predictable, and pragmatic resolutions of these disputes are 
necessary to the United States’ constitutional preservation.  
Functionalism’s rejection of the canon of rule-based reasoning seeks to 
redefine legal rationality as the phenomenon of legitimate judicial 
decision-making. Felix Cohen recognized that creative legal thought looks 
“behind the pretty array of ‘correct’ cases to the actual facts of judicial 
behavior” and makes “increasing use of statistical methods in the scientific 
description and prediction of judicial behavior.”81 The received theory of 
the rule of law suggests that the rational judge obfuscates social policy via 
technical rules. Functionalism instead places social policy as the 
 
 
 79. Id. at 135. 
 80. C.S. PEIRCE, supra note 68, at 6. 
 81. Cohen, supra note 5, at 833.  
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foundation “that gives weight to any rule or precedent.”82 And 
neuroscience, with its ability to explain the phenomenon of human 
decision-making, can prove useful in determining whether placing social 
policy within the foundations of law is, in fact, a rational approach to 
judging. Functionalism offers more than just the creative destruction of 
dusty canons and ratiocinated modes of thinking. It offers a chance for law 
to be truly rational and truth-tracking, which was the project of 
Enlightenment liberalism from the start. 
V. HEURISTIC BIAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
As cognitive neuroscience is a relatively new field, especially as its 
insights apply to law, functionalism, at best, can do little substantive work 
in legal reform. However, what it does do is allow us to admit that 
heuristic biases exist in the legal decision-making process. And it suggests 
that an experientially-informed approach, one that rejects the rationalistic 
fantasy of bifurcating objective reason and subjective emotion, is best 
suited to preserving the liberal understanding of the rule of law. That is to 
say, recognizing heuristic biases and debiasing judicial reasoning via 
evidentiary openness is crucial to jurisprudential legitimacy—the 
touchstone of the rule of law. And it is exercising a jurisprudence of 
legitimacy that ultimately ensures the legal process is rational.  
A hallmark of administrative law is the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),
83
 which usually requires that the public be placed on notice of a 
proposed administrative rule, as well as be given the opportunity to 
comment on the proposed rule (“notice and comment”). The legislative 
justification for the notice and comment provision is to ensure basic due 
process protections and fairness in the rulemaking process, especially 
when, as opposed to legislative rules, administrative rules are derived from 
federal agency employees who are not elected, and therefore not directly 
accountable to the people.  
Functionalism is particularly relevant in administrative law matters 
where courts tend to defer to the administrative expertise of federal 
agencies. Federal agencies generally act by engaging in informal 
rulemaking or adjudications.
84
 But consider the empirical evidence 
 
 
 82. Id. at 834.  
 83. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–706 (2013); see also W. Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 
1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 84. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915) 
(discussing general rulemaking standards) with Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 
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showing discretionary decisions in federal agencies, including those about 
spending, are susceptible to capture by the political interests of Congress 
and especially the President.
85
 Politicized spending would appear to raise a 
problem of democratic legitimacy. Agency discretionary spending 
decisions have been reviewed, if at all, as informal adjudications,
86
 yet our 
system of administrative law provides limited remedies for challenging the 
discretion-based decisions of the government. Neither the courts nor 
Congress have articulated a remedial scheme for recognizing an injury that 
results from political or other biases that influence spending decisions 
committed to agency discretion.  
The APA allows aggrieved parties to seek judicial review of final 
“agency action” so long as review is not precluded by another statute or 
“committed to agency discretion by law.”87 Such decisions are 
unreviewable when courts lack “meaningful standard[s] against which to 
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”88 However, courts will 
invalidate actions that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; 
contrary to a constitutional right; or in excess of statutory jurisdiction or 
authority.
89
 Courts have established that political interference in the 
discretionary decision-making process does run afoul of the APA’s 
standards.
90
  
 
 
(1908) (discussing general adjudicatory standards); see also ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–31 (2d ed. 2010). 
 85. Sanford C. Gordon, Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-Era 
Scandal, 105 AM. POL. SCI. R. 717–34 (2011).  
 86. See A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION § 9.02, at 146 (Michael Asimow ed., 
2003) (stating decisions regarding “grants, benefits, loans, and subsidies” are informal adjudications). 
 87. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Supreme Court has held that a decision is 
committed to agency discretion when “there is no law to apply,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
 88. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The Supreme Court gave more definition to this test in Motor Vehicles 
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983):  
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” . . . 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.  
 90. In D.C. Federation of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
Secretary of Transportation moved a bridge project forward too quickly because of undue pressure 
from a member of Congress. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court refused to allow the action to 
stand “because extraneous pressure intruded into the calculus of considerations on which the 
Secretary’s decision was based.” Id. at 1246. 
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But the remedies for political interference in discretionary spending 
decisions are limited.
91
 Reviewing courts will remand to the agencies and 
instruct them to make new determinations limited to the merits and with 
regard to only those considerations made relevant by Congress.
92
 This 
approach recognizes that not all political contacts with a decision maker 
per se taint the final decision. In determining whether political pressure 
overwhelmed an agency’s process, the D.C. Circuit has established a 
bright-line standard instructing agencies to establish a “full-scale 
administrative record,” such that if a decision is challenged, the agency 
can rely on the record to support its decision.
93
 Under this standard, 
reviewing courts will provide the agency an opportunity to cure its 
politically tainted decision. Remand, “rather than a reinstatement of the 
untainted decisions, is the proper remedy” because, in these cases, courts 
cannot predict how a decision would have been properly decided on the 
merits, and there is no reason to think that on remand the taint would 
necessarily occur again.
94
  
A legal rationalist might approach the issues of politicized spending as 
ones where a certain amount of politicization involved in agency decision-
making ought to be accorded deference, thus eschewing the notion that 
politicized decision making is somehow arbitrary. In fact, several scholars 
and legal commenters have found the federal courts’ consideration of 
political influence in an arbitrary-and-capricious analysis to be 
unwarranted.
95
 These scholars have instead advocated that reviewing 
 
 
 91. See Daniel Z. Epstein, Redressing Politicized Spending, 15 ENGAGE, no. 1, Feb. 2014, at 4, 
available at https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/redressing-politicized-spending. 
 92. See id. Compare Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 
1546 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the Ninth Circuit held that political interference in a formal adjudication 
violated the APA) with ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(where the D.C. Circuit found political pressure did influence the decision maker but instead focused 
not on the content of the political pressure but on “the nexus between the pressure and the actual 
decision maker.”). 
 93. Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In Aera Energy LLC, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld a regional director’s politicized decision to exclude certain oil deposits from a 
leasing scheme because the director admitted that if there was no political influence then he would 
have included the deposits based on criteria not in the statute. The court reasoned that when politics 
infects a decision, the remedy is not to simply provide the plaintiff with the opposite decision, but 
instead to remand the decision to an unbiased appeals board or administrative law judge. Id. at 212. 
 94. Id. at 220 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted) (citing Koniag, Inc., Uyak v. 
Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
 95. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001) (“A 
revised doctrine would acknowledge and, indeed, promote an alternative vision centered on the 
political leadership and accountability provided by the President. This approach, similar to the one I 
have considered in discussing the Chevron doctrine, would relax the rigors of hard look review when 
demonstrable evidence shows that the President has taken an active role in, and by so doing has 
accepted responsibility for, the administrative decision in question.”).  
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courts defer to agency decision-making when presidential influence is 
involved.
96
 These scholarly approaches—unlike the courts’ approach to 
insulate decision makers from political pressure—embrace the inherent 
political nature of the executive branch’s discretionary decisions, under a 
policy rationale that the President, like Congress, is accountable in ways 
courts are not.
97
 Indeed, the APA sets forth a general principle that courts, 
when reviewing agency decisions, should defer to the agency given its 
expertise.
98
 Section 10(e) of the APA allows reviewing courts to set aside 
only agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”99 These sections of the APA have 
been interpreted by courts in the form of a rule articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council 
(“Chevron”).100 Chevron established the doctrinal rule explained as a 
“test” for reviewing administrative determinations. Under the Chevron 
test, step one, courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo 
by applying “traditional tools of statutory construction.”101 Statutory 
interpretation involves certain rules, described as canons of construction. 
Courts begin with the “plain language” meaning of a statute, but can then 
apply canons of construction involving the examination of the “structure, 
purpose, and legislative history” behind the law.102 If the statute is clear, 
the agency’s construction is not entitled to deference; the Court’s sole task 
 
 
 96. Id.; see also Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in 
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). Similarly, Yale Law Professor Kathryn Watts 
urged the courts to consider “the content and the form of the political influence” and engage in line 
drawing “between permissible and impermissible political influences” because “not all political 
influences should be treated as equal.” Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary 
and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 83 (2009); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich L. Rev. 1127 (2010). Watts advised 
courts to distinguish between “valid ‘political’ factors . . . [such as] political actors that speak to policy 
judgments or value-laden judgments [and less-valid] raw partisan politics . . . .” Watts, supra, at 83. 
 97. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to 
be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.”).  
 98. Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 485 F.2d 1018, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See Robert L. Rabin, 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197–1208 (1986).  
 99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 100. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.  
 101. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 102. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659, 663–64 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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is to enforce the statutory language “according to its terms.”103 Under 
Chevron step two, if, after exhausting traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, the court concludes that a statute is ambiguous, then the 
Court will defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute so long as that 
determination is reasonable.
104
 But even when an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute satisfies Chevron, a court must reject that interpretation if it is 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
105
 The arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard requires that an agency’s decision be reasonable and reasonably 
explained.
106
  
However, the scholarly approaches identified above are unlikely to 
persuade courts that have held that agency authority to act comes only 
from Congress.
107
 In fact, the Supreme Court has recently held that a 
decision is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . .”108 The federal courts 
are likely to hold that if Congress wanted presidents and other executive 
branch officials to incorporate political motivations into their decision-
making process, Congress would have included intelligible criteria in its 
authorizing statutes.  
A legal rationalist can rather fluidly apply Chevron in a case of 
politicized decision making because such agency’s interpretation of its 
own rules is likely to be reasonable and reasonably explained. In other 
words, judicial deference is given to a discretionary fiction of the 
administrative agency—an interpretation by an unelected political 
appointee receives deference so long as an unelected reviewing judge 
believes the interpretation is itself “reasonable.”109 That legal rationalism 
can legitimate the illegitimate (politicized decision making) strikes at the 
heart of both the rule of law and the notion of judicial rationality.  
What is typically not used in the opinion-based justifications of judicial 
decision-making is the empirical public policy data that supports certain 
legal conclusions. “Research from the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) suggests that the President will use agency budget requests to 
 
 
 103. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006). 
 104. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 567 F.3d at 663.  
 105. Int’l Union v. MSHA, 626 F.3d 84, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–
44).  
 106. Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 676 F.3d 1098, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 107. Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It is axiomatic that 
administrative agencies may . . . [act] only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.”). 
 108. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 109. Jerome Frank describes such decision making as follows: “[The judge’s decision] is, in every 
sense of the word, ex post facto.” JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 125 (Anchor Books 
1963) (1930). 
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influence agency-based discretionary spending in order to reward 
members of Congress for their votes on a presidential priority.”110 Then-
chairwoman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee 
Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) submitted a committee report that 
stated that “[e]armarking or directed spending of Federal dollars does not 
begin with Congress. It begins with the Executive Branch. . . . The 
Administration determines these projects through a process that is the 
functional equivalent of earmarking.”111 “That federal agencies make 
spending and other discretionary decisions based on the political interests 
of the President is well-established in the political science literature. John 
Hudak, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, found that discretionary 
authority over the allocation of federal dollars provides presidents with the 
opportunity to engage in pork barrel politics, strategically allocating funds 
to key constituencies at critical times.”112 Public policy data that can help 
justify the legitimacy of legal conclusions is not law, but it is a rationally 
appropriate way to provide explanation for decision-making that may 
otherwise rely upon vague legal fictions.  
As the issue of politicized spending shows, questions in administrative 
law reach incommensurable tensions between what is “reasonable” or 
what is appropriate “discretion”—tensions which surrender to further 
biases (policy judgments, formalism, or analytic tests), rather than the 
logical application of legal rules to relevant facts. Ultimately, rule-based 
reasoning is not able to rationally certify what is “reasonable”—that is a 
task for the wisdom of the judiciary. But, so long as that wisdom is 
couched in a milieu of proposition-like erudition, it will be assumed to be 
rational. 
Functionalism, as a jurisprudential explanation, understands that 
judges, in hard cases, seek to determine, “What is a legitimate 
understanding of this case?” Functionalism explains that judges tend to 
 
 
 110. Epstein, supra note 91, at 5.  
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 110-197, at 3 (2007). See also CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL34648, BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICY REGARDING CONGRESSIONALLY ORIGINATED 
EARMARKS: AN OVERVIEW 4 n.13 (2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110375. 
pdf (citing Chuck Conlon & David Clarke, “‘War’ on the Floor,” Cong. Qrtrly BudgetTracker, (June 
12, 2007), available at http://www.cq.com/budgettracker.do (click “Obey’s Prepared Briefing 
Material”)). 
 112. Epstein, supra note 91, at 5 (citing John P. Forrester, Public Choice Theory and Public 
Budgeting: Implications for the Greedy Bureaucrat, in 6 RESEARCH IN PUB. ADMIN.: EVOLVING 
THEORIES OF PUB. BUDGETING 101 (John Bartle ed., 2001); Christopher R. Berry et al., The 
President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783 (2010); John 
J. Hudak, The Politics of Federal Grants: Presidential Influence Over the Distribution of Federal 
Funds 28 (Ctr. for the Study of Democratic Insts. Working Paper No. 01-2011, 2011), available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/CSDI-WP-01-2011.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RATIONALITY, LEGITIMACY, & THE LAW 35 
 
 
 
 
consult the evidence, both legal and extra-legal, that provides the best 
explanation for an ultimate decision on the matter. It views legal materials 
as conceptual tools which hold weight in the decision-making process. In 
matters like the above, a judge would look at precedent and formulaic 
criteria like interpretive canons and holdings from similar cases; 
congressional intent and the agency’s expertise should be considered as 
well. But a fundamental criterion of the judge’s decision-making will be 
whether the agency’s decision-making was legitimate given the available 
evidence. Judges tend to be conscious of the inability of legal rules to 
resolve the tensions implicit in hard cases, and in order to avoid the biases 
involved in analytic gap-filling, judges are drawn to consulting what rule 
or principle can be legitimately justified. Determining legitimacy is not 
making a judgment about whether an agency head was rational or 
exercised proper discretion—our judiciary is often conscious of the biases 
that enter this sort of calculus. Judges ultimately confront the public policy 
arguments and tacit biases employed within the administrative process, 
weighing them as evidence; in doing so, the judge recognizes his or her 
own biases that defer to agency expertise, finding analogical reasoning to 
similar cases appealing and viewing empirical research on the legal issue 
as often irrelevant or merely persuasive authority. In exercising 
functionalism, the judge will want to consider the available rules and 
methods useful in resolving the above dispute; this judge will be less 
concerned with ensuring the rationality of his or her decision, so much as 
ensuring the legitimacy of that decision—both as a matter of consulting 
the relevant materials which help provide validity to his conclusions, as 
well as ensuring, as a cognitive matter, that the errors that arise when an 
individual human determines what is “reasonable” are as minimal as 
possible.  
An important consideration for discretionary matters in administrative 
law is the extent to which an agency “[is] vested with discretion”113 to 
determine whether adverse comments may provide a reasonable basis for 
withdrawing a rule. As such, the “agency must exercise that discretion in a 
well-reasoned, consistent, and evenhanded manner.”114 The agency’s 
 
 
 113. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 781 n.19 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 114. Portland Cement Ass’n v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
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refusal to remove the political taint of a biased adjudication may suggest 
“too closed a mind”115 and be inconsistent with sound public policy.116  
Moreover, the judiciary will recognize the empirical research on the 
question of deference to agency expertise, which suggests that judicial 
review of agency decision-making is unstable, with reviewing courts often 
deferring to agency expertise on grounds of political accountability. 
Research has shown that:  
[i]n assessing how much to defer to an agency’s decision, courts 
perhaps should focus less on the procedures used by the agency (for 
example, notice-and-comment rulemaking, informal adjudication, 
guidance documents) and more on the type of agency, the agency’s 
track record, the agency’s expertise, the level of presidential and 
congressional control over the agency, and the timing of the 
agency’s action.117  
Judicial consideration of these non-rule-like factors, including which party 
is in control of the White House and Congress, may track certain legally 
relevant considerations that affect agency rulemaking (e.g., political 
independence).
118
 By using this kind of evidence to debias the 
decisionmaking process, one is making more legitimate, and therefore 
rational, decisions. As one scholar has suggested,  
[i]f an agency faces considerable oversight from Congress and the 
White House, then perhaps courts should defer to that agency’s 
reasonable decisions, no matter how they are reached (that is, with 
or without particular procedures) and irrespective of whether the 
agency possesses specialized expertise. . . . [i]f an agency receives 
minimal political scrutiny but has extensive expertise, then perhaps 
courts should also defer to that agency’s reasonable actions. 
However, if an agency confronts little oversight from these actors 
and does not possess special expertise, then courts should scrutinize 
that agency’s decisions more carefully.119   
 
 
 115. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see Grand 
Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“the agency’s mind must be open 
to considering” comments). 
 116. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 980–81 (2008).  
 117. Id. at 980. 
 118. Id. at 980–81. 
 119. Id. at 981. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article argued that Legal Rationalism is an insufficient 
explanation for judicial decisions because it fails to include relevant 
information or modes of understanding. Legal decision-making as an 
explanation of the application of law includes rule-based reasoning, social 
and policy preferences, and empirical analysis. Both Legal Realism (social 
sciences) and Functionalism (cognitive neuroscience) are necessary to 
compensate for the insufficiency of Legal Rationalism in explaining 
judicial decisions. Ultimately, functionalism does not give us a “right 
answer” to jurisprudential matters, but it does better explain what makes a 
judicial decision rational.  
This Article supports a legitimacy-based approach to jurisprudence—
and that approach is controversial and refutable. Even assuming that the 
approach were to gain general acceptance, an empirical question arises: if, 
as a factual matter, judicial reasoning is not constrained by rules, then 
what is to say that judges do not, in practice, resolve disputes by 
determining which legal conclusion is most legitimate? In other words, 
there may be no normative issue involved because judges may already be 
applying a theory of legitimacy in their actual resolution of cases. 
Functionalism, then, may be only a descriptive account of judicial 
reasoning and the theory that judges do not act legitimately in resolving 
disputes may be highly suspect as an empirical matter. Legal realism 
suggested that if judges were not constrained by legal rules, then 
something other than rules must guide their reasoning. Legal realists 
argued that this other thing was policy, but what if this “something other” 
was a more descriptive theory of legitimacy, which may or may not 
involve policy arguments? It might be the case that judges are not deeply 
biased, as functionalism suggests, but that instead they use reasonable 
heuristics to resolve disputes, and those heuristics, in practice, may 
involve an exercise of determining what is, in fact, the legitimate 
approach. And are we not merely equivocating here between “rationality” 
and “legitimacy”: perhaps judges tend to label as “rational” those 
decisions that appear intuitively legitimate to them?  
This Article, then, expressly advocates a specific theory of legitimacy, 
one that suggests the possibility of normatively debiasing the judiciary. 
This theory may be wrong. What the functionalist approach does is 
examine whether the judicial exercise of discretion is empirically 
legitimate. Some scholars might agree with the functionalist approach and 
agree that judges look to legitimize their conclusions in the reasoning 
process, but they might disagree on what constitutes a valid theory of 
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legitimacy—in other words, to say that the legitimacy of judicial 
discretion must be an empirical matter is to go too far. Law is not a 
science, and legal argument is the forum for checking the legitimacy of 
judicial opinions—not the experiment room. The goal, then, is to test the 
theory such that even if the theory fails, the exercise yields insight into the 
practice of jurisprudence. Functionalism motivates legal thinkers to 
engage in just this exercise. 
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